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Identity-Based Data Outsourcing With
Comprehensive Auditing in Clouds
Yujue Wang, Qianhong Wu, Member, IEEE, Bo Qin, Wenchang Shi,
Robert H. Deng, Fellow, IEEE, and Jiankun Hu
Abstract— Cloud storage system provides facilitative file stor-
age and sharing services for distributed clients. To address
integrity, controllable outsourcing, and origin auditing con-
cerns on outsourced files, we propose an identity-based data
outsourcing (IBDO) scheme equipped with desirable features
advantageous over existing proposals in securing outsourced data.
First, our IBDO scheme allows a user to authorize dedicated
proxies to upload data to the cloud storage server on her
behalf, e.g., a company may authorize some employees to upload
files to the company’s cloud account in a controlled way. The
proxies are identified and authorized with their recognizable
identities, which eliminates complicated certificate management
in usual secure distributed computing systems. Second, our IBDO
scheme facilitates comprehensive auditing, i.e., our scheme not
only permits regular integrity auditing as in existing schemes
for securing outsourced data, but also allows to audit the
information on data origin, type, and consistence of outsourced
files. Security analysis and experimental evaluation indicate
that our IBDO scheme provides strong security with desirable
efficiency.
Index Terms— Cloud storage, data outsourcing, proof of stor-
age, remote integrity proof, public auditing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
CLOUD platform provides powerful storage services toindividuals and organizations [1]. It brings great benefits
of allowing on-the-move access to the outsourced files, simul-
taneously relieves file-owners from complicated local storage
management and maintenance [2]. However, some security
concerns may impede users to use cloud storage. Among
them, the integrity of outsourced files is considered as a main
obstacle [3], since the users will lose physical control of their
files after outsourced to a cloud storage server maintained
by some cloud service provider (CSP). Thus, the file-owners
may worry about whether their files have been tampered with,
especially for those of importance.
Considerable efforts have been made to address this issue.
Among existing proposals, provable data possession (PDP) [4]
is a promising approach in proof of storage (PoS). With
PDP, the file-owner only needs to retain a small amount of
parameters of outsourced files and a secret key. To check
whether or not the outsourced files are kept intact, the file-
owner or an auditor can challenge the cloud server with low
communication overheads and computation costs. If some
part of the file has been altered or deleted, for example,
due to random hardware failures, the cloud storage server
would not be able to prove the data integrity to convince the
clients.
We observe two critical issues not well addressed in existing
proposals. First, most schemes lack a controlled way of del-
egatable outsourcing. One may note that many cloud storage
systems (e.g., Amazon, Dropbox, Google Cloud storage) allow
the account owner to generate signed URLs using which any
other designated entity can upload, and modify content on
behalf of the user. However, in this scenario, the delegator
cannot validate whether or not the authorized one has uploaded
the file as specified or verify whether or not the uploaded file
has been kept intact. Hence, the delegator has to fully trust the
delegatees and the cloud server. In fact, the file-owner may
not only need to authorize some others to generate files and
upload to a cloud, but also need to verifiably guarantee that
the uploaded files have been kept unchanged. For instance, in
Electronic Health Systems (EHS) [5], [6], when consulting a
doctor, the patient needs to delegate her doctor to generate
electronic health records (EHRs) and store them at a remote
EHRs center maintained by a CSP [7]. In another typical
scenario of cloud-aided office applications, a group of engi-
neers in different places may fulfill a task in cooperation. The
group leader can create a cloud storage account and authorize
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TABLE I
COMPARISON WITH EXISTING RELATED WORKS
the members with secret warrants. The behavior of the group
members and the cloud server should be verifiable.
Second, existing PoS-like schemes, including PDP and
Proofs of Retrievability (PoR) [8], do not support data log
related auditing in the process of data possession proof. The
logs are critical in addressing disputes in practice. For exam-
ple, when the patient and doctor in EHS get involved medical
disputes, it would be helpful if some specific information such
as outsourcer, type and generating time of the outsourced
EHRs are auditable. However, there exist no PoS-like schemes
that can allow validation of these important information in a
multi-user setting.
A. Our Contributions
To address the above issues for securing outsourced data
in clouds, this paper proposes an identity-based data out-
sourcing (IBDO) system in a multi-user setting. Compared
to existing PoS like proposals, our scheme has the following
distinguishing features.
• Identity-based outsourcing. A user and her authorized
proxies can securely outsource files to a remote cloud
server which is not fully trustable, while any unauthorized
ones cannot outsource files on behalf of the user. The
cloud clients, including the file-owners, proxies and audi-
tors, are recognized with their identities, which avoids
the usage of complicated cryptographic certificates. This
delegate mechanism allows our scheme to be efficiently
deployed in a multi-user setting.
• Comprehensive auditing. Our IBDO scheme achieves a
strong auditing mechanism. The integrity of outsourced
files can be efficiently verified by an auditor, even if
the files might be outsourced by different clients. Also,
the information about the origin, type and consistence
of outsourced files can be publicly audited. Similar to
existing publicly auditable schemes, the comprehensive
auditability has advantages to allow a public common
auditor to audit files owned by different users, and in case
of disputes, the auditor can run the auditing protocol to
provide convincing judicial witnesses without requiring
disputing parties to be corporative.
• Strong security guarantee. Our IBDO scheme achieves
strong security in the sense that: (1) it can detect
any unauthorized modification on the outsourced files
and (2) it can detect any misuse/abuse of the
delegations/authorizations. These security properties are
formally proved against active colluding attackers. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first scheme that
simultaneously achieves both goals.
A thorough comparison of our scheme with several related
schemes is shown in Table I in terms of delegated data
outsourcing, certificate-freeness, data origin auditing, data
consistence validation and public verifiability. We also conduct
extensive experiments on our proposed IBDO scheme and
make comparisons with Shacham and Waters’ (SW) PoR
scheme. Both theoretical analyses and experimental results
confirm that the IBDO proposal provides resilient secu-
rity properties without incurring any significant performance
penalties.
B. Related Work
The notion of PDP introduced by Ateniese et al. [4]
allows an auditor to check the integrity of an outsourced
file without retrieving the entire file from the cloud server;
at the same time the server does not need to access the
entire file for answering integrity queries. A subsequent work
in [17] supports modification and deletion, but not insertion
operations on the outsourced data. Yang and Jia [18] presented
a scheme to support dynamic update for the outsourced data.
Wang et al. [19] introduced a third security-mediator into
PDP system to generate verifiable metadata on the outsourced
files in a blind way, so that the security-mediator learns
nothing about the file. Wang et al. [20] offloaded the bur-
densome exponentiations in PDP schemes at the client side
by outsourcing the computations to a single computation
server.
Using proxy re-signatures, Wang et al. [11] proposed
a secure cloud storage scheme with user revocation in a
multi-user setting, that is, if some user is revoked, then
her outsourced data will be re-signed by the cloud storage
server. Chen et al. [12] investigated the relationship between
secure cloud storage and secure networking coding, where
a systematic way is presented to construct a secure cloud
storage scheme from any secure networking coding protocol.
Zhu et al. [21] discussed multicloud storage and presented
a cooperative PDP scheme which can efficiently support
data migration. Wang [22] also considered the multicloud
storage scenario and proposed a secure identity-based scheme.
Recently, Yu et al. [23] studied key-exposure problem in
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secure cloud storage. In [24], an identity-based PDP scheme is
presented from pre-homomorphic signatures to support group-
oriented applications.
Public verifiability is a preferable property for PDP
schemes, which allows anyone to audit the outsourced data
without knowing the private parameters of the data owner.
With this property, the data owner can delegate the rights of
integrity auditing to a third party auditor (TPA) without leaking
private information. Aforementioned schemes [4], [11], [12],
[17], [19], [21], [22] are all publicly verifiable. Jiang et al. [25]
recently presented a publicly verifiable scheme using the
vector commitment technique, which also supports secure user
revocation. Fan et al. [26], Yu et al. [27], and Yu et al. [28]
considered indistinguishability/privacy on outsourced data
against the auditor in auditing integrity. Zhang and
Dong’s publicly verifiable data outsourcing scheme [29] is
proved with tight security reduction in ID-based setting.
Zhang et al. [30] designed a certificateless public verification
scheme which provides stronger security against a malicious
auditor.
PoR [8] is also related to our work, which allows the
cloud server to convince the clients (file-owners and auditors)
that the outsourced files can be successfully retrieved. As
sentinels are used for detecting unauthorized modifications,
only a limit number of integrity queries on the outsourced files
are supported in [8]. Shacham and Waters [9] further presented
three PoR schemes with private and public verifiability, which
are the first with strict security proofs. Bowers et al. [31]
investigated PoR in multi-server setting, which strengthes the
security and availability of outsourced files in the standard
PoR framework.
Another line of related works support delegatable integrity
auditing on outsourced files, yet they cannot support con-
trolled delegatable data outsourcing. Wang et al. [10] proposed
privacy-preserving public auditing cloud storage schemes, in
which a secure TPA is introduced to verify the integrity of
outsourced files, while TPA can learn nothing about the file’s
content. In a proxy PDP scheme presented by Wang [13], if the
designated auditor is unavailable, then the authorized proxy
can be delegated for conducting data possession checking
on behalf of the auditor. Shen and Tzeng [14] proposed a
delegatable PDP scheme, where a user can delegate integrity
auditing capability to a delegatee so that the delegatee can
perform auditing protocol on any outsoured files of this user.
Armknecht et al. [15] studied delegatable auditing for pri-
vately auditable PoR schemes, which simultaneously protects
against collusion attacks by malicious clients, auditors and
cloud servers. Based on a variant of the Schnorr signature,
Wang et al. [16] proposed a secure data outsourcing scheme
in the identity-based setting, however, their scheme also does
not support delegated data outsourcing mechanism.
C. Paper Organization
We describe the IBDO system architecture, threat model
and security goals in Section II. The framework of IBDO
system and the corresponding security model are formalized
in Section III. A detailed IBDO construction is presented
Fig. 1. The architecture of IBDO system
in Section IV. The security and performance of our IBDO
scheme are analyzed in Section V and Section VI, respectively.
Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. System Architecture
The architecture of our IBDO system is shown in Fig. 1.
An IBDO system consists of five types of entities, that is, file-
owners, proxies, auditors, registry server, and storage server.
Generally, the file-owners, proxies and auditors are cloud
clients. The registry server is a trusted party responsible
for setting up the system and responding to the clients’
registration, and also allows the registered clients to store the
public parameters of outsourced files. The cloud storage server
provides storage services to the registered clients for storing
outsourced files. In real-world applications, an organization
buys storage services from some CSP, and the IT department
of the organization can play the role of a registry server. In
this way, the registered clients (employees) can take advantage
of the storage services.
The file-owner and her authorized proxies can outsource
files to the cloud server. Specifically, on behalf of the owner,
the authorized proxy processes the file, sends the processed
results to the storage server, and uploads the corresponding
public parameters of the file to the registry server. Neither the
file-owner nor the proxy is required to store the original file or
the processed file locally. The duty of the auditor is to check
the integrity of outsourced files and their origin-like general
log information by interacting with the cloud storage server
without retrieving the entire file.
B. Adversary Model and Security Goals
An IBDO system confronts two types of active attacks. The
cloud client may impersonate others, specifically, she may
impersonate an owner or another authorized proxy, or abuse a
delegation, and in this way she can process a file and outsource
it to the storage server in an unwanted way. On the other hand,
a malicious storage server may modify or even remove the
outsourced files (for example, for saving storage space or due
to hardware failures), especially for the rarely accessed files.
Taking into account the above realistic attacks, a secure
IBDO system should satisfy the following requirements:
• Dedicated delegation: A delegation issued by a file-owner
can only be used by the specific authorized proxy to
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outsource specified files in a designated way. Even the
authorized proxy cannot abuse it to outsource unspecified
files, and multiple proxies cannot cooperatively deduce
a valid delegation for a new warrant to outsource an
unspecified file.
• Comprehensive auditing: Not only the integrity of the
outsourced file, but also the log information about the
origin, type and consistence of the outsourced files should
be verifiable by the auditors. The integrity auditing
ensures that the outsourced files have been kept intact;
the other general log information auditing ensures that
the file has been outsourced in the designated way. With
comprehensive auditing, an IBDO system can provide
convincing judicial witnesses to address disputes.
III. DEFINITIONS
A. Framework of IBDO System
Formally, an IBDO system consists of five polynomial-
time computable algorithms/protocols, that is, Setup, Regst,
Dlgtn, IBDOsc, and Audit.
• Setup(1κ) → (Para, msk): on input 1κ where κ is a
security parameter, the system setup algorithm, which is
run by the registry server, generates the public parameter
Para for the system and a master secret key msk for the
registry server itself.
• Regst(Para, msk, I Di ) → ski : on input the public
parameter Para, the master secret key msk and an identity
I Di , the register algorithm, which is run by the registry
server, generates a private key ski for user I Di . User I Di
should be able to validate ski and accept it as her/his
private key only if it passes the validation.
• Dlgtn(Para, I Do, sko, I Dp) → (W, σw): on input the
public parameter Para, an identity I Do (file-owner) and
her private key sko, and another identity I Dp (proxy), the
delegating outsourcing rights algorithm, which is run by a
delegator I Do, generates a pair of warrant and delegation
(W, σw) for proxy I Dp . The proxy I Dp should be able
to validate (W, σw) and accept the delegation only if it
passes the validation.
• IBDOsc(Para, W, σw, sk p, M) → (τ, M∗): on input the
public parameter Para, a pair of warrant and delegation
(W, σw), a private key sk p and a file M , the proxy data
outsourcing algorithm, which is run by an authorized
proxy I Dp , generates a file tag τ and a processed file
M∗ on behalf of the file-owner.
• Audit(Para, τ ) → {0, 1}: on input the public parameter
Para and a file tag τ , the public auditing protocol,
which is jointly run by the auditor and storage server,
outputs “1” if the origin and integrity of the outsourced
file specified by τ can be verified as true; otherwise it
outputs “0”.
A secure IBDO scheme must be sound, that is, if all entities
honestly follow the scheme, then no failure will occur at any
stage during the scheme running. Formally, for a security
parameter κ ∈ N and any (Para, msk) ← Setup(1κ), all the
following conditions hold:
• For any private key ski ← Regst(Para, msk, I Di ) issued
by the registry server, it can be validated as true and thus
accepted by user I Di ;
• For any pair of warrant and delegation (W, σw) ←
Dlgtn(Para, I Do, sko, I Dp) issued by user I Do, it can
be validated as true and thus accepted by user I Dp;
• For any outsourced file (τ, M∗) ← IBDOsc(Para, W,
σw, skp, M) under a valid delegation σw , it should be
always audited as true in a round of Audit protocol, that
is, Audit(Para, τ ) = 1.
B. Formal Security Definitions
We present formal security definitions to capture the secu-
rity requirements described in Section II-B. Two types of
probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversaries are used to
model the malicious clients and a dishonest storage server.
The former may collude to forge or abuse the delegation with
regard to some file-owner, while the latter may try to modify
the stored files without being caught.
We first define the security against malicious proxies, where
a PPT adversary A is assumed to play the following game with
a challenger C.
Setup: On input a security parameter κ , the challenger C
generates (Para, msk) and sends public parameter Para to
adversary A.
Queries: Adversary A can adaptively issue the following
queries to C. The challenger maintains the corresponding query
lists which are initially empty.
• Register: The adversary can ask for private key for any
identity I Di . The challenger generates ski and gives it
to A. This query means that the attacker can collude with
some file-owner or proxy.
• Delegation: In each query, the adversary submits a war-
rant W to C. Note that W contains a delegator identity
I Do and a delegatee identity I Dp . If the private key of
I Do has not been queried before, the challenger will
first generate it. Then, the challenger answers with a
delegation σw. This query implies that the attacker can
obtain any normal delegations.
• Processing file: In each query, the adversary submits a
tuple (W, M) to C. If the private key of I Dp and the
delegation in relation to warrant W have not been queried
before, the challenger will first generate them. Then, the
challenger answers with a processed file M∗. This query
implies that the attacker can obtain any processed files.
End-Game: Eventually, the adversary A outputs a
processed file M˜∗ under W˜ . Note that M˜∗ corresponds to an
original file M˜ and W˜ contains a delegator identity I˜ Do and
a delegatee identity I˜ D p . We say the adversary A succeeds
if the following conditions hold, no matter whether M˜∗ can
pass integrity checking for M˜:
• Adversary A has not been made a registry query on
identity I˜ Do to get a private key;
• AdversaryA has not been made a delegation query on W˜ ;
• Adversary A has not been made a processing file query
that involves W˜ ;
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• σ˜w is a valid delegation by delegator I˜ Do to proxy I˜ D p
under W˜ .
Definition 1: An IBDO scheme is secure against adaptive
impersonation and misusing delegation attacks if any PPT
adversary A who plays the above game with C has only
negligible probability in winning the game, that is,
Pr[Awin ] ≤ (κ)
where the probability is taken over all coin tosses made by
C and A.
We proceed to define the security of IBDO scheme against
a dishonest storage server. Although the storage server may
forge a delegation as it holds a mass of delegations for
outsoured files, it can be essentially captured by Definition 1.
Thus, the following security game focuses particularly on the
integrity guarantee on outsourced files.
Setup: On input a security parameter κ , the challenger C
generates (Para, msk) and sends public parameter Para to
adversary A. Then adversary A adaptively requests processed
files in the same way as in Definition 1 by interacting with
the challenger C.
Queries: The challenger adaptively carries out the integrity
and origin auditing protocol with the adversary A. That is,
adversary A plays the role of a prover, in a way it answers
integrity challenges by C on any outsourced file that it holds.
• The challenger C generates a challenge for some out-
sourced file and sends it to A;
• The adversary responds with a proof according to its
maintained processed file;
• The challenger verifies the proof and gives the verification
results to A.
End-Game: Eventually, the challenger and the adversary
carry out a final round of integrity auditing protocol. That is,
the challenger sends out a challenge C˜ for some processed file
M˜∗, and accordingly the adversary returns a proof P˜ . Assume
M˜∗ has been tampered with at the storage server side and the
challenge C˜ touches the corrupted parts of M˜∗. We say that the
adversary A succeeds in the game if the tuple (π˜1, · · · , π˜c, σ˜ )
in the proof P˜ is valid for the challenge C˜ and processed file
M˜∗, while this tuple is different from that generated by C from
the maintained processed file.
Definition 2: An IBDO scheme is secure against modifica-
tion attacks on outsourced files if any PPT adversary A has
only negligible probability in κ in winnig the above game,
that is,
Pr[Awin ] ≤ (κ)
where the probability is taken over all coin tosses made by
C and A.
IV. AN IBDO SCHEME
A. An Overview
It is challenging to achieve both proxy data outsourcing
and comprehensive auditing functionalities in IBDO. At a
first glance, it seems that if the file-owner has delegated
her outsourcing rights to some proxy, then the authorized
proxy can simply employ the existing PDP/PoR schemes
for processing and outsourcing files. However, although this
delegation has been signed by the file-owner, there exists a
gap that the information of the file-owner is not bounded with
the file, which leaves a vulnerability that the proxy may abuse
the delegation without being caught. We fill this gap in our
IBDO construction.
In our IBDO system, to delegate outsourcing rights to a
proxy, the file-owner signs a dedicated warrant for the proxy.
The warrant may specify who can outsource which kind of
files during what time on behalf of the owner, and so on.
When a file is processed, it is partitioned into blocks, so as
to generate metadada for each block individually. The warrant
should be embedded into every metadata, to characterize that
the metadata are generated by the authorized proxy. During the
execution of integrity and origin auditing protocol, except the
aggregate file blocks, the auditor also requests the aggregate
metadata and the signed warrant. Both the aggregate metadata
and signed warrant should be audited, in this way to conclude
that the file is intact and is indeed outsourced by the one as
specified in the warrant.
From a technical point of view, we employ Paterson and
Schuldt’s identity-based signature scheme [32] as building
block. The delegation is generated as an identity-based signa-
ture on a warrant by their scheme, in this way the delegation
can be publicly verified in Audit protocol of IBDO system.
Also, we follow the framework due to Shacham and Waters [9]
to split the file blocks when generating metadata, which
provides a trade-off between storage costs and communication
overheads in auditing.
B. Mathematic Background
Our scheme is built on bilinear groups. Suppose G and GT
are two cyclic groups with prime order q , where G = 〈g〉. The
group G is a symmetric bilinear group if there exists a bilinear
map eˆ : G × G → GT such that: (1) Bilinearity: ∀h1, h2 ∈ G,
and ∀a, b ∈ Z∗q , eˆ(ha1, hb2) = eˆ(h1, h2)ab; (2) Non-degeneracy:
eˆ(g, g) 
= 1 is a generator of GT ; (3) Efficiency: the map eˆ and
group operations in G and GT can be efficiently computed.
CDH Assumption [33]. Suppose G = 〈g〉 is a cyclic group
with prime order q . Given a triplet (g, gα, gβ) with α, β ∈R
Z∗q , for any PPT algorithm A, the probability in computing
gαβ , i.e., Pr
[A(g, gα, gβ) = gαβ], is negligible.
C. System Setup: Setup
Taking as input a security parameter κ , the registry server
randomly picks a cyclic group G = 〈g〉 with prime order q and
a bilinear map eˆ : G × G → GT . Then, randomly choose an
integer a ∈R Z∗q and elements g2, μ0, μ1, · · · , μl , ν0, ν1, · · · ,
ν
, u1, · · · , uB ∈R G, where B is the upper bound of sector
number in file blocks. Computes g1 = ga and msk =
ga2 . The registry server also chooses three collision-resistant
hash functions such as H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l , H2 :
{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}
 and H3 : {0, 1}∗ → G, where the bitstring
lengths l and 
 are determined by κ . The public system
parameter is Para = (1κ, G, GT , eˆ, q, g, g1, g2, μ0, μ1, · · · ,
μl , ν0, ν1, · · · , ν
, u1, · · · , uB, H1, H2, H3). The master key
msk is kept secret by the registry server.
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D. Register: Regst
Using the master secret key msk, the registry server gener-
ates a private key ski for every user I Di who may be a file-
owner or a proxy in the IBDO system. In detail, the registry
server computes
ui = (ui,1, · · · , ui,l ) ← H1(I Di ), (1)
picks a random value ti ∈R Z∗q and generates ski as follows:
ski = (ski,1, ski,2) = (ga2 · (μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
ui, j
j )
ti , gti ) (2)
Finally, the registry server sends ski to I Di .
The user I Di can validate ski = (ski,1, ski,2) by computing
ui and checking whether
eˆ(ski,1, g)
?= eˆ(g1, g2) · eˆ(μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
ui, j
j , ski,2) (3)
If the equality holds, then I Di accepts the private key ski ;
otherwise, she f ails to register.
E. Delegating Outsourcing Rights: Dlgtn
For authorizing a proxy I Dp , the file-owner I Do generates
a warrant W which includes her identity I Do, the proxy’s
identity I Dp , the validity period of W , and may also contain
some other specifics such as file type, etc. For example,
W = I Do‖I Dp‖T imePeriod‖FileT ype. With Para, the
file-owner I Do evaluates hash function
w = (w1, · · · , w
) ← H2(W ) (4)
picks a random value tw ∈R Z∗q and produces a delegation
using her private key as follows:
σw = (ga2 · (μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
uo, j
j )
to · (ν0

∏
j=1
ν
w j
j )
tw, gto, gtw)
The warrant-delegation pair (W, σw) is sent to I Dp .
Upon receiving (W, σw) = (W, (α, β, γ )) from I Do, the
proxy I Dp can validate the delegation. Specifically, he com-
putes the hash values uo ← H1(I Do) and w as shown in
Equations (1) and (4), and checks whether
eˆ(α, g) ?= eˆ(g1, g2) · eˆ(μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
uo, j
j , β) · eˆ(ν0

∏
j=1
ν
w j
j , γ ) (5)
If the condition holds, then the proxy I Dp accepts the del-
egation from I Do which means he is successfully authorized
with the warrant W ; otherwise, he rejects the delegation.
F. Identity-Based Data Outsourcing: IBDOsc
Given a file M ∈ {0, 1}∗ to be outsourced under a valid
warrant-delegation pair (W, σw), the authorized proxy I Dp
partitions the file M into blocks such that each block comprises
c (1 ≤ c ≤ B) sectors, that is, M = (mi, j )r×c where
mi, j ∈ Zq . Then, I Dp chooses a random identifier f id ∈R
Z∗q and a random value t f ∈R Z∗q for file M , computes
v f = gt f , and sets τ0 = W‖ f id‖r‖c‖gto‖gtp‖gtw‖v f . The
proxy I Dp proceeds to choose a (one-time) signature scheme
S = 〈Kgen, Sig, Vrf〉 and generates the file tag for M as
τ = τ0‖S.Sig(τ0, tsk)‖t pk, where (t pk, tsk) ← S.Kgen(1κ).
The proxy I Dp continues to create metadata σi (1 ≤ i ≤ r)
for each file block using his private key skp as follows
σi = ga2 · (μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
up, j
j )
t p · (H3(W‖ f id‖i) ·
c∏
j=1
u
mi, j
j )
t f
Finally, the file tag τ is sent to the registry server, while the
processed file M∗ that comprises M , f id , {σi }1≤i≤r and the
first entry of delegation σw is uploaded to the cloud storage
server and removed at the proxy I Dp’s local side.
G. Auditing Outsourced Data: Audit
The auditing procedure consists of three phases: challenge,
response and verification.
Phase 1 (Challenge): The auditor first makes sure the file
tag τ is valid, that is, he retrieves τ from the registry server
and performs S.Vrf(τ0, t pk). If it is invalid, which means this
outsourced file cannot be audited, then the protocol aborts;
otherwise, the auditor parses τ0 to obtain the total number r
of file blocks. The auditor randomly picks a nonempty subset
I ⊆ [1, r ] along with a number of random values si ∈R Z∗q
for every i ∈ I . After that, the auditor sends the challenge
C = {(i, si ) : i ∈ I } and file identifer f id to the storage
server.
Phase 2 (Response): When receiving a challenge C and a
file identifier f id , the storage server locates to the correspond-
ing outsourced file M∗ and computes
π j =
∑
i∈I
si mi, j mod q for all j ∈ [1, c], and σ =
∏
i∈I
σ
si
i .
The storage server sends to the auditor a proof P which
consists of π1, · · · , πc, σ and the first part of delegation.
Phase 3: (Verification): On receiving a proof P , with Para
and τ , the auditor computes uo ← H1(I Do), u p ← H1(I Dp),
and w ← H2(W ) as shown in Equalities (1) and (4). The
auditor checks the validity of σw indicated by Equality (5)
and σ as follows
eˆ(σ, g) ?= eˆ(g1, g2)
∑
i∈I si · eˆ(μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
up, j
j , g
tp)
∑
i∈I si
·eˆ(
∏
i∈I
H3(W‖ f id‖i)si ·
c∏
j=1
u
π j
j , v f ) (6)
If Equality (5) holds, the auditor concludes that I Dp is
authorized by I Do with W . If Equality (6) also holds, she
is convinced that the challenged file is intact.
In the above three-phase auditing procedure, the auditor
can also simultaneously request for the specifics (e.g., file
creation/process/outsourcing time) associated with the war-
rant W of the audited file. In this case, the response P will
additionally contain the requested data specifics, so that they
can be checked by the auditor. In fact, the verification on these
specifics requires no crypto techniques.
946 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. 12, NO. 4, APRIL 2017
H. Discussions
As remarked in [32], each user I Di can re-randomize
his/her private key ski = (ski,1, ski,2) issued by the registry
server, that is, he/she may pick a random value t ′i ∈R Z∗q and
generates sk ′i as follows
sk ′i = (sk ′i,1, sk ′i,2) = (ski,1 · (μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
ui, j
j )
t ′i , skt
′
i
i,2)
= (ga2 · (μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
ui, j
j )
ti+t ′i , gti+t ′i )
In a similar way, the proxy is also able to re-randomize
the received delegation. However, when processing and out-
sourcing a concrete file, both private keys of the file-owner
and authorized proxy as well as the corresponding delegation
should be fixed, although they might be different for distinct
files. In fact, this is realized by inserting gto, gtp, gtw into the
file tag. Also, since v f is contained in the file tag, the cloud
server cannot randomize the metadata.
Besides, although our IBDO scheme is proposed in sym-
metric bilinear groups, it can also be efficiently instantiated
using asymmetric bilinear mapping eˆ : G1 × G2 → GT , that
is, by choosing H3 : {0, 1}∗ → G2, and letting g be from G1,
and g2, μ0, μ1, · · · , μl , ν0, ν1, · · · , ν
, u1, · · · , uB from G2.
V. SOUNDNESS AND SECURITY
We show the soundness of our scheme, that is, if all the
entities in the IBDO system behave honestly, then the regis-
tration information, delegation and processed file produced by
the proposed IBDO scheme can be correctly audited.
Theorem 1: In a successful registration, the client always
accepts the private key generated by the registry server. The
proxy always accepts the delegation if the corresponding file-
owner is honest. If the target outsourced file has not been
tampered with, then the proof generated by the storage server
will be verified as valid.
Proof: We only need to show that Equation (3),
Equation (5) and Equation (6) all hold. The correctness of
Equality (3) is straight-forward. Since uo = (uo,1, · · · , uo,l)
and w = (w1, · · · , w
), it follows that
eˆ(α, g) = eˆ(ga2 , g) · eˆ((μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
uo, j
j )
to, g) · eˆ((ν0

∏
j=1
ν
w j
j )
tw, g)
= eˆ(g1, g2) · eˆ(μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
uo, j
j , β) · eˆ(ν0

∏
j=1
ν
w j
j , γ )
Therefore, Equality (5) holds.
Note that π j = ∑i∈I si mi, j mod q for all j ∈ [1, c] and
σ =
∏
i∈I
(ga2 )
si ·
∏
i∈I
((μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
up, j
j )
t p)si
·
∏
i∈I
((H3(W‖ f id‖i) ·
c∏
j=1
u
mi, j
j )
t f )si
= (ga2 )
∑
i∈I si · ((μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
up, j
j )
t p)
∑
i∈I si
·(
∏
i∈I
H3(W‖ f id‖i)si ·
c∏
j=1
u
∑
i∈I si mi, j
j )
t f
We have
eˆ(σ, g) = eˆ(g1, g2)
∑
i∈I si · eˆ(μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
up, j
j , g
tp)
∑
i∈I si
·eˆ(
∏
i∈I
H3(W‖ f id‖i)si ·
c∏
j=1
u
π j
j , g
t f )
Hence, Equality (6) holds. 
The following theorems guarantee the security of our IBDO
scheme as defined.
Theorem 2: Suppose the CDH assumption holds in bilinear
groups and the signature scheme S used for generating file tags
is secure. The proposed IBDO scheme is secure against adap-
tive impersonation and misusing delegation attacks. Specifi-
cally, neither any client nor the cloud storage server can forge
a valid delegation on some warrant with regard to any file-
owner, any proxy and any file of his choice, and in this way
outputs a valid processed file under this delegation.
The following proof follows the standard framework estab-
lished in [32], [34].
Proof: Assume the adversary A can output a processed
file that contains a forged delegation with probability , in
relation to some warrant he generates. Then, we show that
adversary A can break Paterson and Schuldt’s identity-based
signature scheme [32] with probability at least . In the
following, algorithm C will perfectly simulate a challenger
when interacting with adversary A.
The challenger C is given a group G = 〈g〉 with prime order
q and a CDH instance (g, ga, h), whose target is to compute
ha by interacting with A.
Setup. The challenger C sets lu = 2(qr + qd) and lw =
2qd , where qr and qd represent the total number of register
queries and delegation queries, respectively. It is assumed that
lu(l + 1) < q and lw(
 + 1) < q . The challenger C then picks
a series of random values as follows
ku
R← [0, l], and kw R← [0, 
]
x ′ R← Z∗lu , and xi
R← Z∗lu for every 1 ≤ i ≤ l
y ′ R← Z∗q , and yi R← Z∗q for every 1 ≤ i ≤ l
z′ R← Z∗lw, and z j
R← Z∗lw for every 1 ≤ j ≤ 

 ′ R← Z∗q , and  j R← Z∗q for every 1 ≤ j ≤ 

θ j , ϑ j
R← Z∗q for every 1 ≤ j ≤ c
Then, the challenger C sets the public parameters as follows
g1 = ga, g2 = h
μ0 = g−lu ku+x ′2 gy
′
, μi = gxi2 gyi for every1 ≤ i ≤ l
ν0 = g−lwkw+z′2 g
′
, ν j = gz j2 g j for every1 ≤ j ≤ 

u j = gθ j2 gϑ j , 1 ≤ j ≤ c
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These parameters perfectly simulate the adversary A’s view,
that is, they are computationally indistinguishable from the
public parameters in Para. Note that the solution for the given
CDH instance is the same as the master secret key msk.
Queries. The adversary A can adaptively issue the follow-
ing queries to the challenger C.
Register Queries: The adversary A adaptively submits iden-
tities to C for requesting private keys. Since the challenger
C does not have the master secret key msk, he will answer
this type of queries as follows. For each queried identity I Di ,
the challenger C computes ui as defined in Equality (1). For
simplicity of presentation, we set
F(ui ) = x ′ +
l∑
j=1
x jui, j − luku, and J (ui ) = y ′ +
l∑
j=1
y jui, j .
Thus, we have μ0
∏l
j=1 μ
ui, j
j = gF(ui )2 g J (ui).
If F(ui ) 
= 0 mod q , then the challenger C chooses a
random value ti ∈R Z∗q and computes a private key ski =
(ski,1, ski,2) such that
ski,1 = g
− J (ui )F(ui )
1 · (μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
ui, j
j )
ti , and ski,2 = g
− 1F(ui )
1 g
ti .
If denotes t ′i = ti − a/F(ui), then one can check that the
above private key ski is valid for I Di due to the following
equalities
ski,1 = ga2 · (gF(ui )2 · g J (ui))
− aF(ui ) · (gF(ui )2 · g J (ui))ti
= ga2 · (gF(ui )2 · g J (ui))
ti− aF(ui ) = ga2 · (μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
ui, j
j )
t ′i
and ski,2 = gti−a/F(ui) = gt ′i . Thus, the private key ski
generated in this way is computationally indistinguishable
from the real private key in the adversary’s perspective.
Otherwise, i.e., F(ui ) = 0 mod q , the algorithm aborts.
Delegation Queries: The adversary A can adaptively submit
a warrant W to the challenger C, where W specifies a delegator
I Do, a proxy I Dp and some other specific information. The
challenger C will generate a delegation of I Do for I Dp with
the warrant W as follows. The challenger first computes uo
as shown in Equality (1) and evaluates F(uo), then gets into
one of the following two cases.
Case 1: F(uo) 
= 0 mod lu . In this case, the challenger C
generates a private key sko for I Do as discussed in register
queries, and generates a delegation σw as described in our
scheme. The challenger C gives σw to A.
Case 2: F(uo) = 0 mod lu . For a given W , the challenger
C computes w as shown in Equality (4). Similar to the
discussions of register queries, for simplicity, we set
K ( w) = z′ +

∑
j=1
z j w j − lwkw, and L( w) =  ′ +

∑
j=1
 j w j .
Thus, we have ν0
∏

j=1 ν
w j
j = gK ( w)2 gL( w).
If K ( w) = 0 mod q , the algorithm aborts; otherwise,
the challenger C chooses random values to, tw ∈R Z∗q and
computes a delegation σw = (σw,1, σw,2, σw,3) where
σw,1 = (μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
uo, j
j )
to · g−
L( w)
K ( w)
1 · (ν0

∏
j=1
ν
w j
j )
tw,
σw,2 = gto, and σw,3 = g−
1
K ( w)
1 · gtw.
If denote t ′w = tw − a/K ( w), then the delegation σw
generated in this way is computationally indistinguishable
from the real delegation in the adversary’s view due to the
following equality
σw = (ga2 · (μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
uo, j
j )
to · (ν0

∏
j=1
ν
w j
j )
t ′w, gto, gt
′
w)
Delegated Data Processing Queries: The adversary A can
adaptively submit a tuple (W, M) to the challenger C, where
W specifies a file owner I Do, a proxy I Dp and some other
specific information. From the proposed scheme, we know that
the register query and delegation query should be submitted at
first, with inputs (I Do, W ) and I Dp , respectively. If F(uo) =
0 mod lu and K ( w) = 0 mod q , where uo ← H1(I Do) and
w ← H2(W ), then C just aborts the game since he cannot
generate a delegation for the given identities and warrant. For
the case that F(uo) 
= 0 mod lu or K ( w) 
= 0 mod q , the
challenger C carries out the following steps.
Step 1: The challenger generates a delegation σw as dis-
cussed in delegation queries.
Step 2: Computes u p ← H1(I Dp) as shown in Equality (1).
If F(u p) = 0 mod lu , then the challenger aborts. Otherwise,
the challenger extracts a private key skp for I Dp as we discuss
above. The challenger C picks a random value t f ∈R Z∗q
and a random unique identifier f id for file M , and computes
v f = gt f . For each file block mi = (mi,1, · · · , mi,c) where
1 ≤ i ≤ r , picks random values tˆi ∈R Z∗q and sets
H3(W‖ f id‖i) = gtˆi
/
(g
∑c
j=1 θ j mi, j
2 · g
∑c
j=1 ϑ j mi, j )
That is,
(H3(W‖ f id‖i) ·
c∏
j=1
u
mi, j
j )
t f = (gtˆi )t f = (gt f )tˆi
Next, the challenger computes the metadata for file block mi
as σi = ga2 ·(μ0
∏l
j=1 μ
up, j
j )
t p ·(gt f )tˆi . It is easy to see that the
metadata generated here is computationally indistinguishable
from the real one in the adversary’s view.
Step 3: The challenger sends the processed file M∗ which
includes {σi }1≤i≤r ∪ {σw, f id} to A.
End-Game. Finally, if the challenger does not abort, then
the adversary A will output a forgery
M˜∗ = (m˜i, j )r˜×c˜ ∪ {σ˜i }1≤i≤r˜ ∪ {σ˜w, f˜ i d}
in relation to some warrant W˜ with non-negligible probability.
According to Definition 1, the adversary A succeeds in the
game means that σ˜w is valid for W˜ . It further implies σ˜w is a
forged signature for W˜ in identity-based setting. Thus, if the
adversary A can break the proposed scheme with probability
, then it can also break Paterson and Schuldt’s identity-based
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signature scheme [32] (i.e., outputs ha) with probability at
least . 
Theorem 3: Suppose the CDH assumption holds in bilinear
groups and the signature scheme S used for generating file
tags is secure. The proposed IBDO scheme is secure against
modification attacks. Specifically, the storage server cannot
forge a valid response for any integrity auditing challenge,
if the challenged file blocks in the outsourced file have been
corrupted.
The following proof is inspired by a standard framework
established in [9].
Proof: The proof consists of a list of security games along
with respective analysis.
Game 0. In this game, both the adversary and the challenger
behave in the way defined in Definition 2.
Game 1. This game is identical to Game 0, with the follow-
ing difference. The challenger maintains all the processed files
that have been provided to the adversary in Setup phase. In the
final round of integrity auditing protocol, the adversary outputs
a proof that satisfies verification equation (6) for the challenge
C˜ , warrant W˜ and processed file M˜∗, while the aggregate
metadata is not equal to that generated by the challenger from
its maintained information.
Analysis. Suppose the adversary A succeeds in Game 2
with non-negligible probability. Then, we can construct an
algorithm C to solve the CDH problem. Algorithm C is given
a group G = 〈g〉 with prime order q and a CDH instance
(g, gα, h), whose goal is to output hα by interacting with A.
Algorithm C behaves like a challenger of Game 0, but with
the following differences:
• It picks a random value a ∈R Z∗q , and sets g1 = ga , g2 =
h and msk = ga2 . Also, it randomly chooses θ j , ϑ j
R← Z∗q
for each 1 ≤ j ≤ c, and computes u j = gθ j2 gϑ j .
• It controls the random oracle H3 so that it maintains all
the queries and answers them in a consistently manner.
For the queries of the form H3(W‖ f id‖i), it will respond
in the following way as shown in processing file.
• For processing a file M under W , it first computes u p ←
H1(I Dp) as defined in Equality (1), and extracts a private
key sk p for I Dp as defined in the proposed scheme (see
Equality (2)). The challenger C picks a random unique
identifier f id and a random value a¯ ∈R Z∗q for file M ,
and computes v f = (gα)a¯ which implies t f = αa¯. For
each file block mi = (mi,1, · · · , mi,c) where 1 ≤ i ≤ r ,
picks a random value tˆi ∈R Z∗q and sets
H3(W‖ f id‖i) = gtˆi
/
(g
∑c
j=1 θ j mi, j
2 · g
∑c
j=1 ϑ j mi, j )
That is,
(H3(W‖ f id‖i) ·
c∏
j=1
u
mi, j
j )
t f = (gtˆi )t f = (v f )tˆi
The challenger proceeds to compute the metadata for file
block mi as σi = ga2 · (μ0
∏l
j=1 μ
up, j
j )
t p · (v f )tˆi . It is
easy to see that the metadata generated in this way is
computationally indistinguishable from the real metadata
in the adversary’s view.
• Algorithm C interacts with the adversary A to perform
the integrity auditing protocol. As specified in Game 1,
the game aborts if the adversary outputs an aggregate
metadata σ˜ that is not equal to the expected one σ in a
round of auditing.
Let (π˜1, · · · , π˜c) be the aggregate challenged file sectors in
the proof P˜ . Thus, we have
eˆ(σ˜ , g) = eˆ(g1, g2)
∑
i∈I si · eˆ(μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
up, j
j , g
tp)
∑
i∈I si
·eˆ(
∏
i∈I
H3(W˜ ‖˜ f id‖i)si ·
c∏
j=1
u
π˜ j
j , v f ) (7)
and
eˆ(σ, g) = eˆ(g1, g2)
∑
i∈I si · eˆ(μ0
l∏
j=1
μ
up, j
j , g
tp)
∑
i∈I si
·eˆ(
∏
i∈I
H3(W˜ ‖˜ f id‖i)si ·
c∏
j=1
u
π j
j , v f ) (8)
Note that π˜ j = π j cannot hold for all 1 ≤ j ≤ c since
otherwise, σ˜ = σ . If denote π j = π˜ j −π j , then at least one
element of {π j : 1 ≤ j ≤ c} should be nonzero. Dividing
Equality (7) by Equality (8) on respective sides and assuming
v f = (gα)a¯ f , we get
eˆ(σ˜ /σ, g) = eˆ(
c∏
j=1
u
π j
j , v f ) = eˆ(
c∏
j=1
(gθ j2 g
ϑ j )π j , (gα)a¯ f )
It further implies
eˆ(σ˜ σ−1(gα)−a¯ f
∑c
j=1 ϑ j π j , g) = eˆ(h, gα)a¯ f
∑c
j=1 θ j π j
Thus, we get the solution of the given CDH instance as follows
hα = (σ˜ σ−1(gα)−a¯ f
∑c
j=1 ϑ j π j )
1
a¯ f
∑c
j=1 θ j π j
as long as a¯ f
∑c
j=1 θ jπ j 
= 0 mod q . Since some of {π j :
1 ≤ j ≤ c} are nonzero and a¯ f , θ j for 1 ≤ j ≤ c are random
values, we know Pr[a¯ f ∑cj=1 θ jπ j = 0 mod q] = 1/q .
Thus, if the difference between the adversary’s probabilities
of success in Game 0 and Game 1 is non-negligible, then we
can construct an algorithm C as discussed above to solve the
CDH problem.
Game 2. This game is identical to Game 1, with the
following difference. As in Game 1, the challenger maintains
all the processed files that have been provided to the adversary
in Setup phase. In the final round of integrity auditing pro-
tocol, the adversary outputs a proof that satisfies verification
equation (6) for the challenge C˜ , warrant W˜ and processed file
M˜∗, while at least one of the aggregate challenged file sectors
is not equal to that generated by the challenger according to
its maintained information.
Analysis. Suppose the adversary A succeeds in Game 2
with non-negligible probability. Then, we can construct an
algorithm C to solve the discrete logarithm (DL) problem.
Algorithm C is given a group G = 〈g〉 with prime order q
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TABLE II
COMPARISON ON COMPUTATION COSTS OF EACH ALGORITHM IN IBDO SCHEME AND SW SCHEME
and a DL instance (g, h), whose goal is to output α so that
h = gα by interacting with A.
Algorithm C behaves like a challenger of Game 1, but with
the following differences:
• For processing a file M under W , it first computes
u p ← H1(I Dp) and extracts a private key skp for
I Dp as in the proposed scheme. Also, it processing
file M by following our scheme but using parameters
u j = gθ j2 gϑ j for each 1 ≤ j ≤ c, where θ j , ϑ j
R← Z∗q . It
is easy to see that the metadata generated in this way is
computationally indistinguishable from the real metadata
in the adversary’s view.
• Algorithm C interacts with A to perform the integrity
auditing protocol. As specified in Game 2, the game
aborts if the outputted aggregate file sectors {π˜ j : 1 ≤
j ≤ c} are different from the expected ones {π j : 1 ≤
j ≤ c} in a round of auditing.
According to Game 1, we know that σ˜ = σ . By checking
Equality (7) and Equality (8), it follows that
eˆ(
∏
i∈I
H3(W˜ ‖˜ f id‖i)si ·
c∏
j=1
u
π˜ j
j , v f )
= eˆ(
∏
i∈I
H3(W˜ ‖˜ f id‖i)si ·
c∏
j=1
u
π j
j , v f )
It further implies that
∏c
j=1 u
π˜ j
j =
∏c
j=1 u
π j
j . Let π j =
π˜ j − π j for each 1 ≤ j ≤ c. Thus, at least one element of
{π j : 1 ≤ j ≤ c} should be nonzero. We get
c∏
j=1
u
π j
j =
c∏
j=1
(
gθ j2 g
ϑ j
)π j = h
∑c
j=1 θ j π j g
∑c
j=1 ϑ j π j = 1
Thus, we get the solution of the given DL instance as follows
α = −(
c∑
j=1
ϑ jπ j )(
c∑
j=1
θ jπ j )−1 mod q
as long as
∑c
j=1 θ jπ j 
= 0 mod q . Since some of {π j :
1 ≤ j ≤ c} are nonzero and θ j for 1 ≤ j ≤ c are
random values, we know Pr[∑cj=1 θ jπ j = 0 mod q] = 1/q .
Thus, if the difference between the adversary’s probabilities of
success in Game 1 and Game 2 is non-negligible, then we can
construct an algorithm C as discussed above to solve the DL
problem.
Since the hardness of CDH problem implies that of DL
problem, we complete the proof by combing Game 0, Game 1
and Game 2. 
VI. EVALUATION
A. Modification Checkability Analysis
The detection probability of the storage server’s misbehavior
in PoS related schemes has been discussed in [4] and [10]
etc. In our scheme, when auditing an outsourced file, both
the delegation σw and the aggregate metadata σ should be
validated by the auditor. If the delegation has been tampered
with, then it can always be detected by the auditor in an
execution of auditing protocol according to Equality (5) and
Theorem 2. Furthermore, similarly to the results in [4], if t
blocks have been tampered with or deleted by the storage
server, then the auditor can detect this misbehavior with
probability p = 1 − ∏|I |−1i=0 r−t−ir−i . Particularly, if t percent of
file blocks have been tampered with, the detection probability
p on the corrupted file is only determined by the number of
challenged blocks |I |, that is, p ≈ 1 − (1 − t)|I |. In this case,
the auditor can challenge |I | ≈ ln(1 − p)/ ln(1 − t) blocks
in a round of auditing to achieve detection probability p. For
example, if the delegation is intact while one percent of blocks
are corrupted, then it can be detected with probability of 90%
and 99% by random choosing 230 and 460 blocks for auditing
in a challenge, respectively.
B. Theoretical Analysis
We summarize the computation costs of each algorithm
and protocol in Table II, which shows a comparison between
our scheme and Shacham and Waters’ publicly verifiable PoR
scheme over bilinear groups [9]. The costs of file tag genera-
tion and verification are not counted as they are determined by
the specific signature scheme S chosen at the processing file
phase. In the table, M and E denote one multiplication and
one exponentiation in G, respectively; similarly, MT and ET
respective denote one multiplication and one exponentiation in
GT ; Mq and Aq represent one multiplication and one addition
in Zq , respectively; P denotes one bilinear pairing evaluation
eˆ : G × G → GT . We do not differentiate hash evaluations of
H1, H2 or H3, and denote them commonly as H. Since both g1
and g2 are public parameters in our IBDO scheme, eˆ(g1, g2)
can be pre-computed and looks also as a public value. Thus, it
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TABLE III
COMPARISON WITH SW SCHEME IN BILINEAR GROUPS
is not included in Table II. As known that exponentiations and
pairings are more time-consuming compared to the other ones,
they would essentially determine the efficiency of these two
schemes.
In both schemes, all verification cases at user side take only
constant pairings, that is, when verifying a private key issued
by registry server, validating a delegation generated by a file
owner, or checking a proof in a round of (comprehensive)
auditing. All other phases do not involve pairing evaluations.
For processing a file M with sectors {mi, j }r×c, SW scheme
takes (rc + r) exponentiations, rc multiplications and r hash
evaluations. Our scheme only incurs one more time-consuming
exponentiation, plus r efficient multiplications. Thus, both SW
scheme and ours enjoy the same efficiency level for processing
the same file. When performing a round of auditing protocol
on an outsourced file, both schemes require the same number
(i.e., |I |) of exponentiations in group G at cloud storage
server side. While at auditor side, SW scheme takes (|I | + c)
exponentiations in group G and two pairings to check a proof,
and our scheme would take another four pairings in order to
auditing the corresponding delegation.
Table III further compares our IBDO scheme with SW
scheme in terms of storage costs at the cloud side, communi-
cation overheads in a round of auditing as well as designing
settings. In the table, E SG and E Sq respectively denote the
byte size of group elements in G and Z p. The block numbers
i ∈ I in a challenge are taken as elements in Zq . For realizing
origin auditing on outsourced file, our scheme should let cloud
storage server to keep one more element in G, that is, the
first element in the delegation for this file, when compared to
SW scheme. Also, this additional element would be sent to
the auditor when performing comprehensive auditing in our
scheme.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
We conducted experiments on our IBDO scheme and the
SW schem using Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) library
(http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/). All algorithms and protocol
were coded using C programming language and conducted on
a system with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-5200U CPU at 2.20GHz
and 2.20 GHz and 4.00GB RAM in Windows 8. The elliptic
curve is of type y2 = x3 + x with |q| = 160 bits and E SG =
256 bits. We set l = 160 and 
 = 160. The file sectors are of
160 bits size.
The performance of generating and verifying a private key
for some user in Regst, and that of generating and verifying a
delegation in Dlgtn are shown in Figure 2. The time consumed
by each of these steps is roughly 10ms, which is negligible
for deploying in real-world applications. As discussed in
Section VI-B, processing a file using both our scheme and the
SW scheme would run a number of exponentiations in group
Fig. 2. Performance of Regst and Dlgtn
Fig. 3. Performance of processing a 1MB file with different sector numbers
G. In detail, when processing a file of S bytes by splitting
into sectors of size ssec, it will create r = S/(c · ssec) file
blocks. Thus, the number of required exponentiations under
both schemes for generating metadata would respectively be
NI B DO =  S
c · ssec (c + 1) + 1, and
NSW =  S
c · ssec (c + 1).
We compare the efficiency of both schemes by letting them
processing a 1MB file, and consider several cases with dif-
ferent splitting manners, that is, we set c = 100, · · · , 500,
respectively. In our experiment setting, ssec = 20 bytes. The
experimental results shown in Figure 3 indicate that both
schemes enjoy the same efficiency level in all processing cases.
This is consistent with above theoretical analysis.
Figure 4 shows the time to audit an outsourced file with
1% corruption. We do not take into account the time costs of
preparing a challenge C since it can be run offline for sampling
a series of random elements. In the experiments, each file
block consists of 100 sectors, which means that it has around
4KB of size. We consider several cases of achieving different
detection probability of corruption, i.e., 0.5, · · · , 0.99. The
simulation results of Figure 4 demonstrate that our IBDO
scheme has comparable efficiency as SW scheme at both sides
of the auditor and cloud storage server in carrying out the
auditing protocol. For example, for realizing 0.9 detection
probability, the auditor in both schemes can finish in less than
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Fig. 4. Performance in a round of (comprehensive) auditing protocol
with different detection probability on a 1% corrupted file. (a) Cloud side.
(b) Auditor side.
1.2 seconds. Also, in both schemes, the time cost at the auditor
side is larger than that at the cloud side, which is consistent
with the theoretical analysis shown in Table II. Note that the
former can be shared by several auditors in a multi-auditor
setting. That is, several auditors can cooperatively audit the
same file to achieve a high detection probability of corruption,
where each auditor needs only to audit a different part of
the outsourced file with a low detection probability. Lower
detection probability requires smaller amount of computations
so that it would be more efficient for each involved auditor.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated proofs of storage in cloud
in a multi-user setting. We introduced the notion of identity-
based data outsourcing and proposed a secure IBDO scheme. It
allows the file-owner to delegate her outsourcing capability to
proxies. Only the authorized proxy can process and outsource
the file on behalf of the file-owner. Both the file origin and
file integrity can be verified by a public auditor. The identity-
based feature and the comprehensive auditing feature make
our scheme advantageous over existing PDP/PoR schemes.
Security analyses and experimental results show that the
proposed scheme is secure and has comparable performance
as the SW scheme.
REFERENCES
[1] D. Song, E. Shi, I. Fischer, and U. Shankar, “Cloud data protection for
the masses,” Computer, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 39–45, Jan. 2012.
[2] C.-K. Chu, W.-T. Zhu, J. Han, J. K. Liu, J. Xu, and J. Zhou, “Security
concerns in popular cloud storage services,” IEEE Pervasive Comput.,
vol. 12, no. 4, pp. 50–57, Oct. 2013.
[3] K. Yang and X. Jia, “Data storage auditing service in cloud computing:
Challenges, methods and opportunities,” World Wide Web, vol. 15, no. 4,
pp. 409–428, 2012.
[4] G. Ateniese et al., “Provable data possession at untrusted stores,”
in Proc. 14th ACM Conf. Comput. Commun. Secur., New York, NY,
USA, 2007, pp. 598–609.
[5] J. Sun and Y. Fang, “Cross-domain data sharing in distributed electronic
health record systems,” IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst., vol. 21, no. 6,
pp. 754–764, Jun. 2010.
[6] J. Sun, X. Zhu, C. Zhang, and Y. Fang, “HCPP: Cryptography based
secure EHR system for patient privacy and emergency healthcare,”
in Proc. IEEE 31st Int. Conf. Distrib. Comput. Syst. (ICDCS), Jun. 2011,
pp. 373–382.
[7] L. Guo, C. Zhang, J. Sun, and Y. Fang, “PAAS: A privacy-preserving
attribute-based authentication system for eHealth networks,” in Proc.
IEEE 32nd Int. Conf. Distrib. Comput. Syst. (ICDCS), Jun. 2012,
pp. 224–233.
[8] A. Juels and B. S. Kaliski, Jr., “PORs: Proofs of retrievability for large
files,” in Proc. 14th ACM Conf. Comput. Commun. Secur., New York,
NY, USA, 2007, pp. 584–597.
[9] H. Shacham and B. Waters, “Compact proofs of retrievability,”
J. Cryptol., vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 442–483, 2013.
[10] C. Wang, S. S. M. Chow, Q. Wang, K. Ren, and W. Lou, “Privacy-
preserving public auditing for secure cloud storage,” IEEE Trans.
Comput., vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 275–362, Feb. 2013.
[11] B. Wang, B. Li, and H. Li, “Panda: Public auditing for shared data
with efficient user revocation in the cloud,” IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput.,
vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 92–106, Feb. 2015.
[12] F. Chen, T. Xiang, Y. Yang, and S. S. M. Chow, “Secure cloud storage
meets with secure network coding,” IEEE Trans. Comput., vol. 65, no. 6,
pp. 1936–1948, Jun. 2016.
[13] H. Wang, “Proxy provable data possession in public clouds,” IEEE
Trans. Services Comput., vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 551–559, Oct./Dec. 2013.
[14] S.-T. Shen and W.-G. Tzeng, “Delegable provable data possession
for remote data in the clouds,” in Information and Communications
Security (Lecture Notes in Computer Science), vol. 7043, S. Qing,
W. Susilo, G. Wang, and D. Liu, Eds. Berlin, Germany: Springer, 2011,
pp. 93–111.
[15] F. Armknecht, J.-M. Bohli, G. O. Karame, Z. Liu, and
C. A. Reuter, “Outsourced proofs of retrievability,” in Proc. ACM
SIGSAC Conf. Comput. Commun. Secur., New York, NY, USA,
Nov. 2014, pp. 831–843.
[16] H. Wang, Q. Wu, B. Qin, and J. Domingo-Ferrer, “Identity-based remote
data possession checking in public clouds,” Inf. Security, IET, vol. 8,
no. 2, pp. 114–121, Mar. 2014.
[17] G. Ateniese, R. di Pietro, L. V. Mancini, and G. Tsudik, “Scalable and
efficient provable data possession,” in Proc. 4th Int. Conf. Secur. Privacy
Commun. Netw., New York, NY, USA, 2008, Art. no. 9.
[18] K. Yang and X. Jia, “An efficient and secure dynamic auditing protocol
for data storage in cloud computing,” IEEE Trans. Parallel Distrib. Syst.,
vol. 24, no. 9, pp. 1717–1726, Sep. 2013.
[19] B. Wang, S. S. M. Chow, M. Li, and H. Li, “Storing shared data on
the cloud via security-mediator,” in Proc. IEEE 33rd Int. Conf. Distrib.
Comput. Syst. (ICDCS), Jul. 2013, pp. 124–133.
[20] Y. Wang et al., “Securely outsourcing exponentiations with single
untrusted program for cloud storage,” in Computer Security—ESORICS,
vol. 8712. Switzerland: Springer, 2014, pp. 326–343.
[21] Y. Zhu, H. Hu, G.-J. Ahn, and M. Yu, “Cooperative provable data
possession for integrity verification in multicloud storage,” IEEE Trans.
Parallel Distrib. Syst., vol. 23, no. 12, pp. 2231–2244, Dec. 2012.
[22] H. Wang, “Identity-based distributed provable data possession in mul-
ticloud storage,” IEEE Trans. Services Computing, vol. 8, no. 2,
pp. 328–340, Mar. 2015.
[23] J. Yu, K. Ren, C. Wang, and V. Varadharajan, “Enabling cloud storage
auditing with key-exposure resistance,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics
Security, vol. 10, no. 6, pp. 1167–1179, Jun. 2015.
[24] Y. Wang, Q. Wu, B. Qin, X. Chen, X. Chen, X. Huang, and
J. Lou, “Ownership-hidden group-oriented proofs of storage from
pre-homomorphic signatures,” Peer-to-Peer Netw. Appl., pp. 1–17,
2016. [Online]. Available: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/
s12083-016-0530-8?no-access=true
[25] T. Jiang, X. Chen, and J. Ma, “Public integrity auditing for shared
dynamic cloud data with group user revocation,” IEEE Trans. Comput.,
vol. 65, no. 8, pp. 2363–2373, Aug. 2016.
[26] X. Fan, G. Yang, Y. Mu, and Y. Yu, “On indistinguishability in remote
data integrity checking,” Comput. J., vol. 58, no. 4, pp. 823–830, 2015.
[27] Y. Yu et al., “Enhanced privacy of a remote data integrity-checking
protocol for secure cloud storage,” Int. J. Inf. Secur., vol. 14, no. 4,
pp. 307–318, Aug. 2015.
[28] Y. Yu et al., “Identity-based remote data integrity checking with perfect
data privacy preserving for cloud storage,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics
Security, to be published.
[29] J. Zhang and Q. Dong, “Efficient ID-based public auditing for the
outsourced data in cloud storage,” Inf. Sci., vols. 343–344, pp. 1–14,
May 2016.
[30] Y. Zhang, C. Xu, S. Yu, H. Li, and X. Zhang, “SCLPV: Secure
certificateless public verification for cloud-based cyber-physical-social
systems against malicious auditors,” IEEE Trans. Comput. Social Syst.,
vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 159–170, Dec. 2015.
[31] K. D. Bowers, A. Juels, and A. Oprea, “HAIL: A high-availability and
integrity layer for cloud storage,” in Proc. 16th ACM Conf. Comput.
Commun. Secur., New York, NY, USA, 2009, pp. 187–198.
[32] K. G. Paterson and J. C. N. Schuldt, “Efficient identity-based signatures
secure in the standard model,” in Information Security and Privacy
(Lecture Notes in Computer Science), vol. 4058, L. Batten and
R. Safavi-Naini, Eds. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer, 2006,
pp. 207–222.
952 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, VOL. 12, NO. 4, APRIL 2017
[33] D. Boneh, B. Lynn, and H. Shacham, “Short signatures from the weil
pairing,” in Proc. ASIACRYPT, vol. 2248. 2001, pp. 514–532.
[34] B. Waters, “Efficient identity-based encryption without random oracles,”
in Advances in Cryptology–EUROCRYPT (Lecture Notes in Computer
Science), vol. 3494, R. Cramer, Ed. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer,
2005, pp. 114–127.
Yujue Wang received the Ph.D. degrees from
Wuhan University, Wuhan, China, and City Uni-
versity of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, in 2015, under
the joint Ph.D. program. He is currently a Research
Fellow with the School of Information Systems,
Singapore Management University. His research
interests include applied cryptography, database
security, and cloud computing security.
Qianhong Wu (M’15) received the Ph.D. degree in
cryptography from Xidian University in 2004. Since
2004, he has been with Wollongong University,
Australia, as an Associate Research Fellow, with
Wuhan University, China, as an Associate Professor,
and with Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Spain, as a
Research Director. He is currently a Professor in
Beihang University, China. He has been a holder
or co-holder of eight China/Australia/Spain funded
projects. He has authored over 20 patents and over
120 publications in leading journals and conferences.
His research interests include cryptography, information security and privacy,
VANET security, and cloud computing security. He is a member of IACR.
He has served on the program committee of several international conferences
on information security and privacy.
Bo Qin received the Ph.D. degree in cryptography
from Xidian University, China, in 2008. Since 2008,
she has been with the Xi’an University of Technol-
ogy, China, as a Lecturer and with Universitat Rovira
i Virgili, Catalonia, as a Post-Doctoral Researcher.
She is currently a Lecturer with Renmin Univer-
sity, China. She has been a holder/co-holder of
five China/Spain funded projects. She has authored
over 80 publications in well-recognized journals and
conferences. Her research interests include pairing-
based cryptography, data security and privacy, and
VANET security. She has served on the program committee of a number of
international conferences in information security.
Wenchang Shi received the bachelor’s degree from
Peking University, and the master’s and Ph.D.
degrees from the Chinese Academy of Science. He
is currently a Full Professor with the Renmin Uni-
versity of China and also an Adjunct Professor with
the Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese
Academy of Sciences. His research interests include
information system security and operation system
security. He has authored over 100 publications in
these areas and holds over 10 patents.
Robert H. Deng (F’16) was a Principal Scientist and
the Manager of the Infocomm Security Department,
Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore. He has
been a Professor with the School of Information
Systems, Singapore Management University, since
2004. His research interests include data security
and privacy, multimedia security, and network and
system security. He received the University Out-
standing Researcher Award from the National Uni-
versity of Singapore in 1999 and the Lee Kuan Yew
Fellow for Research Excellence from the Singapore
Management University in 2006. He was named Community Service Star
and Showcased Senior Information Security Professional by (ISC)2 under
its Asia-Pacific Information Security Leadership Achievements Program in
2010. He has served on the editorial boards of many international journals,
including IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECU-
RITY, IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING,
the Journal of Computer Science and Technology (the Chinese Academy
of Sciences), and the International Journal of Information Security. He is
currently the Chair of the Steering Committee of the ACM Asia Conference
on Computer and Communications Security.
Jiankun Hu received the Ph.D. degree in control
engineering from the Harbin Institute of Technology,
China, in 1993, and the master’s degree in com-
puter science and software engineering from Monash
University, Australia, in 2000. He was a Research
Fellow with the Delft University of Technology, The
Netherlands, from 1997 to 1998, and Melbourne
University, Australia, from 1998 to 1999. He has
been with Ruhr University, Bochum, Germany. He
is currently a Full Professor and the Research Direc-
tor of the Cyber Security Laboratory, School of
Engineering and Information Technology, University of New South Wales,
Australia. His main research interest is in the field of cyber security, including
biometrics security, where he has authored many papers in high-quality
conferences and journals, including the IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON PATTERN
ANALYSIS AND MACHINE INTELLIGENCE. He has received seven Australian
Research Council (ARC) Grants, and serves at the prestigious Panel of
Mathematics, Information and Computing Sciences and the ARC Excellence
in Research for Australia Evaluation Committee. He received the prestigious
German Alexander von Humboldt Fellowship from Ruhr University from 1995
to 1996. He has served on the Editorial Board of up to seven international
journals, including IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS
AND SECURITY, and served as the Security Symposium Chair of IEEE ICC
and IEEE Globecom.
